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FIXING COPYRIGHT IN THREE IMPOSSIBLE
STEPS: REVIEW OF HoW To FIX COPYRIGHT BY
WILLIAM PATRY
MARK P. McKENNA*
William Patry is one of the world's best and most experienced copyright
lawyers. In his distinguished career he has played nearly every imaginable
role: full-time legal academic, treatise author, copyright litigator at a major
firm, copyright counsel to the U.S. House of Representatives, policy
planning advisor to the Register of Copyrights, and Senior Copyright
Counsel at Google. When someone with that depth of experience
pronounces the copyright system fundamentally broken, we have serious
problems. And yet that is precisely what Patry has done in How to Fix
Copyright.'
Patry is at pains to insist that he does not advocate for the repeal of
copyright law altogether, but one could be forgiven for believing he has
made a compelling case for just that.2  As Patry ably demonstrates,
copyright is overwhelmingly irrelevant to creativity, and much of the
current copyright system creates significant economic harm in its pursuit of
ever greater control for copyright owners.' Yet Patry believes this system
can be salvaged, if only policymakers would embrace empirical evidence
and focus on overall utility.'
To my mind, the most striking thing about Patry's reform proposals is
their essential impossibility, given the political economy of copyright.' I
do not mean this as a criticism of Patry-his proposals are generally quite
sensible, and they flow naturally from the evidence Patry insists ought to
guide our copyright policymaking. But two of his major proposals-
*Professor of Law and Notre Dame Presidential Fellow, Notre Dame Law School.
1. WILLIAM PATRY, How To Fix COPYRIGHT (2011).
2. Id. at 11.
3. Id at 15 26, 29 32.
4. Id at 50-52.
5. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Is Copyright Reform Possible? 126 HARV.
L. REV. 740 (2013) (reviewing PATRY, supra note 1, and JASON MAZZONE, COPYFRAUD
AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2011), and discussing
mechanisms for possible reform).
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shortening of the copyright term6 and reinstatement of formalities7 -are,
for all practical purposes, non-starters. Congress has a long and unbroken
practice of lengthening copyright,' and the United States' full entry into the
Berne Convention, which largely prohibits formalities, makes re-imposition
of formalities extremely unlikely.9 Patry knows this, and perhaps that is
why he eschews a summary section with a list of specific
recommendations, and why the book lacks detailed description of how
these reforms would come to pass. 10 It is hardly that Patry is unfamiliar
with the mechanisms for copyright reform; it is instead that he so well
understands the unlikelihood of his proposals that such a level of detail is
not really worth the effort.
What then do we make of a book that offers such a devastating critique
of copyright in its current form, identifies some reforms that would make
the system more defensible,' and yet seems almost resigned to the
impossibility of those reforms? One answer is that Patry's book tees up an
existential crisis for copyright: if the current copyright system diverges so
significantly from one rationally related to its purposes, and if reforms that
would bring copyright closer to those purposes are essentially impossible,
can copyright be justified at all? Put differently, is there any real difference
between offering such unrealistic proposals and advocating abolition of
copyright?
I will not try to answer those questions directly here. Instead, I will focus
on three themes that I think are worth emphasizing even if Patry's ultimate
proposals are unlikely to gain any traction. First is Patry's insistence that
copyright policy be based on real-world evidence, a suggestion that should
be uncontroversial but instead runs headlong into the near-religious
commitments of copyright stakeholders.12 Second is Patry's highlighting of
the gulf between the interests of creators, on the one hand, and owners of
copyright interests, on the other." Third, and finally, is Patry's focus on the
6. PATRY, supra note 1, at 189-90.
7. Id. at 203.
8. Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 272, 278-80 (2004).
9. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5,
Sept. 9, 1886; 1986 U.S.T. Lexis 160, available at http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs woOO1.html (entered into force for U.S. Mar. 1, 1989 (Sen.
Treaty Doc. 99-27)).
10. Id. at 5-6; Samuelson supra note 5, at 741 (noting that Patry's book does not
discuss how the reforms might be accomplished).
11. More defensible, but surely not entirely so, as Patry largely ignores copyright
scope. Obviously scope would be less critical if the copyright term were shortened and
affirmative claiming required, but in many cases questions about scope are inescapable.
Cf id., at 741 (arguing that Patry's reform proposals are incomplete).
12. Id at 50-51.
13. Id at 30, 38-39.
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copyright system's strong tendency to entrench business models and resist
change, particularly in the face of new technology.' 4 All of these themes
have received extensive discussion elsewhere. Patry, for example, is not the
first to note that copyright law primarily serves the interests of publishers,
record labels, and other distributors, or that owners' interests often diverge
sharply from those of creators. Likewise, copyright's role in protecting
business models is well understood. But Patry's discussion weaves these
themes together more thoroughly than most other treatments, and he
sometimes signals a much firmer commitment to reorienting copyright to
protect creators' interests over those of the distributor/intermediaries than
do other reform proposals.
EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING
Patry's overriding criticism of copyright is that the law is
overwhelmingly developed on the basis of ideology rather than empirical
evidence. Indeed, "[p]olicymakers have been operating in an evidence-free
copyright law zone for many decades."" It is received wisdom that authors
would not create without copyright;16 that because copyright law is
necessary for creativity, more copyright must lead to more creativity; ' that
"creative industries" are the basis for the knowledge economy;" piracy is a
huge problem that is devastating the creative industries;19 and others do not
really "need" access to a work because they can (and should) create their
own works.2 0 Virtually no evidence is demanded on these claims in the
first place, and policymakers (Congress in particular) pay little attention to
the evidence when it is available.
There are a couple of reasons for this failure to engage evidence. One is
that copyright is enormously important to certain parties with economic
interests in copyright. Many of the claims made regarding copyright are
really focused on the economic effects of various policies on those
particular parties. These claims are frequently made without any supporting
data and/or are wildly overstated.2 1 But even if the claims were based on
solid empirical evidence, they would still only reflect part of the story,
because there is no reason to assume that the overall effects of copyright
necessarily mirror the effects on particular parties. It is not as if the money
made (or potentially made) by those who administer one set of rights to a
14. Id at 2, 46-47.
15. Id at 51.
16. Id. at 75-76.
17. Id. at 79.
18. Id.
19. Id at 63-67.
20. Id at 13.
21. Id at 51-53 (discussing inaccurate information policymakers receive).
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work (those who, for example, license sound recordings) would vanish into
thin air if the copyright system did not maximally protect those parties'
interests. Patry usefully reminds us of the difference between micro effects
(the effects on particular parties) and the broader macro effects that ought
to guide policy. He argues, for example, that copyright should be structured
so that all of the rights to a particular work can easily be cleared at once,
even if that requires eliminating the business models of some entrenched
interests. Similarly, Patry suggests that the massive costs of clearing rights
in out-of-print books indicate a serious problem. Those costs are
consequences of excessively long copyright and the lack of any
requirement that authors act affirmatively to secure or retain their rights.22
If we incur those costs for the benefit of only a few authors or
intermediaries, we need to ask why the consequences for the few are
allowed to outweigh the costs to the many.
Another reason copyright policy is so resistant to evidence, which
operates mostly below the surface of Patry's discussion, is the persistence
of moral claims that are used to backstop economic claims about the
importance of copyright. On one level, we are told that copyright is critical
to economic growth. Yet when economic evidence is brought to bear on
questions relating to the proper scope of copyright, then copyright interests
often shift to arguments that sound in "wrongfulness."23 Copying someone
else's work is simply "unfair", so it is "wrong" even if it has little or no
effect on incentives. Such claims of unfairness, often predicated on or
offered in tandem with allegations of "free-riding", have proven
rhetorically powerful in intellectual property generally. 4 But aside from
the fact that these arguments are selectively deployed (if copyright were
primarily about moral claims of authors, then the constant claims about
economic impact are beside the point), these moral arguments offer no
logical stopping point. Free-riding is ubiquitous in a competitive economy,
and emotional appeals to unfairness rarely offer principles on which to
distinguish legitimate from illegitimate forms.25
Here I think it would have been useful for Patry to lay more of his cards
on the table in terms of the justifications for copyright. His criticisms of
22. See id at 194-95 (discussing the cost of clearing rights).
23. Id. at 59 ("Since Mr. Burnham could not challenge any of the empirical
conclusion in the Gowers report, he instead relied on a previously unarticulated and
undefined 'moral case at the heart of copyright law."').
24. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109
MICH. L. REv. 137 (2010) (criticizing free riding arguments in trademark law); Wendy
J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149 (1992) (describing, and criticizing, courts' tendency to
decide cases on intuitions of fairness and distaste for free riding).
25. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
257 (2007) (noting the ubiquity of spillovers from intellectual creations and the
positive value associated therewith).
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policymakers for failing to follow evidence generally sound utilitarian: he
chides Congress and the courts for paying too much attention to the
interests of entrenched interests and not enough attention to the overall
costs of overprotection.26 But his suggestions that copyright ought to be
more focused on creators, and particularly the implication that copyright
should be geared toward enabling those creators to make a living,27 indicate
Patry's utilitarianism may not be so thoroughgoing. For it is not entirely
clear that, overall, we would be better off providing more compensation to
creators. To be sure, the creators would likely be better off under such a
system. As Patry shows, however, we would get much of the creativity we
desire without any protection at all.28 Thus it seems that Patry's appeals to
the interests of creators have at least a tinge of normative preference for
creators as a class. That preference may well be justified - a system that
rewarded creators might well give us more interesting work or a more just
society - but it is not clear such a system would increase overall social
utility, which the preponderance of Patry's analysis suggests is copyright's
purpose.
I think there is at least one other important reason that copyright
policymaking is so resistant to evidence, on which Patry only barely
touches-the professional investment of lawyers in the prevailing wisdom
of copyright. Intellectual property orthodoxy runs deep, so deep that
despite his trenchant and wide-ranging criticisms of the copyright system,
Patry repeatedly insists that he does not advocate abolition of copyright. In
that respect it often seems that Patry is pulling his punches; his argument
goes far beyond a critique of the current legal rules and actually
undermines the narrative on which copyright is traditionally justified.
Perhaps it is unfair to have expected a more robust affirmative defense of
the idea of copyright. After all, Patry's book is focused on how to fix
copyright, and he does suggest that any justification for copyright needs to
focus on creators' ability to make a living. But given the impracticality of
the major reforms Patry proposes, one might reasonably conclude that he
may as well have advocated abolition.
The point here is not to criticize Patry for not having done so-I doubt I
would have-but instead to point out how difficult it is for intellectual
property lawyers even to entertain the idea of life without copyright,
notwithstanding powerful arguments that undermine the central premises of
the system. Copyright lawyers are deeply invested in a narrative of
creativity in which copyright plays a necessary role, just as patent lawyers
are deeply invested in the idea that patent protection is central to
26. PATRY, supra note 1, at 103-18.
27. Id. at 127 (arguing that "we do need [copyright] for those who do want to
make a living from their works regardless of why they created them in the first place").
28. Id at 78-80.
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innovation. Beliefs in these narratives are highly resilient to contrary
information. Despite substantial evidence that patent law is doing more
harm than good in most industries, 9 for example, no legal scholar has
seriously advocated that patent law be abolished. Intellectual property
lawyers, including academics, believe fundamentally in the correctness of
the incentive narrative, which is firmly entrenched as the rule, and
information about the harm patent law causes in various industries is
cordoned off as exceptional. Scholars advocate modest reforms, but rarely
(if ever) fundamental ones.o
Non-legal scholars are, by contrast, sometimes willing to consider much
more radical changes. Two economists, Michele Boldrin and David
Levine, have argued strenuously that most intellectual property laws should
be eliminated.31 A number of economists have devoted serious attention to
prizes as alternatives to exclusive rights.32 Legal scholars, however,
largely push back against these arguments or ignore them altogether, even
though they rarely take on directly the evidence that Boldrin and Levine
marshal. 33 The bottom line is that lawyers are entrenched interests too, and
they are professionally invested in the system. It is therefore easy for
lawyers to justify the current legal structure, at least in broad strokes.
Modest changes to that system are tolerable, but radical ones (which might
cost a number of lawyers substantial revenue) rarely are. I do not suggest
that this explains Patry's positions; collectively his proposals are
significantly more radical than most in the copyright area that I can
29. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2009) (finding that
the overall costs imposed by the patent system outweigh its benefits, and that patent
law has net positive value only in a very few industries, such as the pharmaceutical
industry).
30. This is not to say that none of the reform proposals would have real impact.
For example, Mark Lemley's suggestion that functional claiming be limited seems
likely to improve things considerably in the software area. See Mark A. Lemley,
Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 Wisc. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=
2117302.
31. MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, THE CASE AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY (2008). See also Michele Boldrin & David K. Levin, The Case Against
Patents (Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2012-035A, 2012),
available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-035.pdf.
32. See Boldrin & Levine, supra note 37, at 4-5, 21.
33. For a rare example of direct engagement with Boldrin and Levine, see Mark
A. Lemley, A Cautious Defense of Intellectual Oligopoly with Fringe Competition, 5
REV. L. & ECON. 3 (2009) (reviewing BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 31). Legal
scholars have taken prizes somewhat more seriously. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The
Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 58
UCLA L. REv. 970, 985-88 (2012); Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56
VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003).
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remember. But it is what Patry is up against, and one reason why evidence-
free policymaking is so pervasive.
Efforts like Patry's could nevertheless do some good insofar as they put
greater pressure on those who would claim even broader rights to make
their case by reference to evidence. Much copyright expansion occurs
because the policymakers hear only from those who stand to benefit. That,
of course, is often not a mere oversight-as Patry notes, hearings before
Congress are nearly always stacked such that only pro-copyright talking
points get aired. 34 But courts face different institutional constraints, and
they are often called on to make policy-based judgment calls. Focusing
courts on the right questions and highlighting the available evidence on
those questions might allow them to think in a more balanced way about
some edge cases. It might, for example, help courts decide what kinds of
uses ought to be regarded as fair use, when to ratchet up the originality
requirement, or when to imply exceptions to the DMCA anti-circumvention
provisions. These would be most improvements, but improvements
nonetheless.
CREATORS VS. OWNERS
The most persuasive part of Patry's book, in my view, is his discussion
of the divergent interests of creators (to whom copyright offers very little
by way of incentives to create) and rights owners, who frequently are not
creators and whose work is not especially creative at all." As Patry
demonstrates, many authors (indeed, for most types of works, the
overwhelming majority of authors) have no use for copyright.36 When
authors once were required to claim copyright affirmatively by registering
their works, very few did.37 Even fewer re-claimed copyright when it was
time to renew. Having eliminated formalities, copyright now
automatically sweeps into its ambit huge numbers of works that the
creators do not really care to have protected. Why does it do that?
One answer is that we are concerned about protecting the smaller
number of authors who do want to claim rights, and we are willing to be
over-inclusive in order to reduce the burden on those authors. And there is
no doubt that some of the old formality rules were quite byzantine, so some
unsophisticated authors who did want to claim rights may well have been
penalized by those rules. But if one assumes copyright law aims to
maximize overall social utility, then it is hard to imagine how the benefits
of eliminating those burdens on unsophisticated authors could outweigh the
34. PATRY, supra note 1, at 167-68.
35. Id. at 103, 107-08, 164.
36. Id at 103.
37. Id at 104-05.
38. Id at 104.
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massive transaction costs created by sweeping in so many works for which
the owners have little interest in copyright. It is even harder to imagine
extending the duration of all of those undesired copyrights to life of the
author plus seventy years, allowing ownership of all of those works to be
fragmented, and failing to create a mechanism through which would-be
users could find information about the works and potentially locate their
owners.
A more plausible explanation for copyright's overbreadth-and an
explanation that is consistent with copyright law's history-is that authors
are not (and have never really been) copyright's primary concern. After
all, it has long been an open secret that very little of the money generated in
"creative industries" (a term I used advisedly) actually flows to the
creators. Patry illustrates this quite well, and his account is consistent with
the longstanding sense that record label and movie studio accounting
practices were themselves creative works.39 If copyright law were really
animated by creators' interests, it would be hard to imagine how this state
of affairs could persist, notwithstanding attempts to rationalize the
outcomes by suggesting (farcically) that they are simply the result of
consensual transactions. At the very least the fact that so little of the
money makes its way to the creators who nevertheless continue to create so
much is powerful additional evidence of the irrelevance of copyright
incentives, or perhaps the incredible power of the optimism bias.
More likely, authors are romanticized because they are sympathetic,
which explains why copyright interests always advocate publicly for
greater enforcement by suggesting (sometimes quite vividly) that users are
taking food out of authors' mouths.40 But this is much like trademark
owners' cynical exploitation of "consumer interests" in trademark law-
neither authors' nor consumers' interests really drive the law, and indeed
many expansions that are contrary to their interests are achieved in their
name. One contribution of Patry's book is to shine an even brighter light
on these claims, and perhaps to focus our attention more clearly on
copyright's real beneficiaries-the distributors-so that we can more
honestly determine whether and when distributors' interests need
protection, independent of rhetoric about creators.
Greater attention to the interests of creators might also influence some
modest reforms that courts are well-situated to implement. For this to work,
however, courts must first firmly reject the notion that copyright serves
39. Id. at 119-25.
40. See, e. g., Recording Industry Begins Siting P2P File Sharers Who Illegally
Qffer Copyrighted Music Online, RIAA (Sept. 8, 2003), http://riaa.com/
newsitem.php?id=85183A9C-28F4-19CE-BDE6-F48E206CE8A1 (quoting Bart
Herbison, Executive Director, Nashville Songwriters Association International: "When
someone steals a song on the Internet it is not a victimless crime. Songwriters pay their
rent, medical bills and children's' educational expenses with royalty income.").
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creators' interests by providing an incentive to create or to distribute.
Patry's discussion (which builds on empirical evidence developed by many
others) makes clear that this is not copyright's real role.4 Copyright could
be tailored to help creators by making it possible for them to earn a living
as professionals.42 To achieve that for creators, courts would have to adopt
rules that shift the balance of power away from copyright intermediaries
and toward the creators themselves. They might do so by interpreting
contracts more favorably to artists, being less willing to assume that
authors have surrendered their rights in the absence of clear evidence, and
by being exacting in their analysis of the work for hire doctrine. They
might also recognize the inevitability of borrowing in the process of
creation and therefore interpret fair use broadly and be more reluctant to
find infringement in the absence of more substantial copying.
BUSINESS MODELS AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
The final major theme of Patry's that I wish to take up here has to do
with copyright's role in structuring the markets in which works are
exploited.43 As Patry very ably demonstrates, copyright's complexity is to
a significant degree a function of the fragmentation of ownership, each of
the many stakeholders having developed their stakes under certain
prevailing market conditions that may no longer obtain.44 The distinction
between musical work and the sound recording, for example, is a byproduct
of the fact that music was once fixed in tangible form primarily by
rendering notation on sheet music. Rather than reconceiving that paradigm
when technology later allowed for fixation in recordings, Congress instead
created new exclusive rights in sound recordings that are distinct from
rights in the musical work.45 That might have seemed workable (even if it
added transaction costs) for as long as it was true that music was first fixed
in written form and then only later recorded. But as Bob Brauneis has
noted, that is no longer how musicians work.46 Music is now often fixed
for the first and only time in a sound recording, making it difficult, if not
impossible, to determine where the musical work ends and the sound
recording begins. The distinction between the musical work and the sound
41. PATRY, supra note 1, at 77-78.
42. Cf ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 195 (2011).
43. PATRY, supra note 1, at 143-45.
44. Id at 144.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012). According to the Copyright Act, a sound recording
is a work "that result[s] from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other
sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes,
or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
46. Robert Brauneis, The Musical Work in the Age of Sound Recordings (draft on
file with author).
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recording, however, is practically quite important because sound recording
rights are more limited,47 and because rights to the musical work and those
to the sound recording may well be owned by different parties.
Given the additional difficulties entailed in a system with such a duality
of rights (multiplication of which makes certain kinds of uses essentially
impossible), 48 why have we not streamlined? The obvious answer is that
there are entrenched interests that have built business models around
administration of these distinct rights, and one or more interests would be
hurt by consolidation.4 9 We could say something very similar about why
owners of various interests have been so slow to adapt to new technologies,
despite the fact that those technologies have nearly always added enormous
economic value. Even if the VCR expanded markets and opened up new
revenue streams for copyright owners, its introduction threatened existing
distribution practices, just as downloading and streaming threaten physical
distribution and sequencing of movies.
It is, of course, inevitable that economic interests will harden around
existing rules and technologies. But that is all the more reason to be
skeptical of claims by rights owners that new technologies threaten
creativity- what they really mean is that those new technologies threaten
certain entrenched interests. Patry usefully reminds us here that we ought to
be particularly careful about crediting those claims in the face of
technological change, as history teaches that new business models will
develop around new technology." That is, in effect, an argument in favor
of copyright flexibility, and the need to revisit copyright's basic structure
periodically. And Patry has given us the broad outlines against which to
judge its condition at any particular time. That is a significant achievement.
47. See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2012).
48. See Patry's discussion of the difficulty of sampling in this age. PATRY, supra
note 1, at 182-85.
49. See, e.g In re Cellco P'ship, 663 F.Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (rejecting
the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers' argument that a wireless
company must pay public performance licensing fees for ringtones).
50. PATRY, supra note 1, at 142-45.
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